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WILLIAM ROWE ON THE EVIDENTIAL 
VALUE OF APPEARANCES! 
James Beilby 
While William Rowe has argued that the principle of credulity does not lend 
justification to religious experience, he must affirm something quite like the 
principle of credulity in his empirical argument from evil. To do so Rowe 
has proposed a modified version of the principle of credulity. 
I shall argue that Rowe's modified principle of credulity creates for him a 
dilemma regarding the justification of belief in other minds. I further suggest 
it is not adequate for bridging the logical gap between the existence of 
apparently pointless evils and the existence of genuinely pointless evil. 
While radical empiricism as an epistemic theory has fallen on hard times, 
there still exists significant debate on the evidential value of appearances or 
initial perceptions. Of particular interest has been the principle of credu-
lity-an epistemic construct which suggests that the fact that something ap-
pears a certain way gives one justification for believing that it is in fact that 
way unless overriding conditions obtain. 
William Rowe, a prominent atheist, has found himself in a precarious 
position regarding the principle of credulity. On the one hand, he argues that 
the principle of credulity does not lend justification to religious experience 
and therefore any argument for the existence of God based on such experi-
ences is invalid. On the other hand, Rowe must affirm something quite like 
the principle of credulity to bridge the logical gap between the acknowledged 
fact that apparently pointless evils exist and the assertion that genuinely 
pointless evils exist-an assertion that his empirical argument from evil re-
quires. 
In an attempt to walk this tightrope successfully, Rowe has proposed a 
modified version of the principle of credulity which, if valid, will allow him 
to affirm that one is prima facie justified in believing that genuinely pointless 
evil exists on the basis of experiencing evil that apparently has no justifying 
good while rejecting the prima facie justification of believing that God exists 
based on an experience presumed to be of a Deity. 
I shall argue in this paper that Rowe arbitrarily assigns a higher evidential 
value to appearances which argue against theism (e.g., apparently pointless 
evils) than he does to those which argue for theism (e.g., religious experi-
ences). If my argument is correct, Rowe must provide justification for this 
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seemingly contradictory practice. If he cannot, he must alter either his posi-
tion on the evidential value of religious experiences or his formulation of the 
empirical argument from evil. 
1. Rowe s Epistemology of Religious Experience 
It was C. D. Broad who first suggested an epistemic construct which would 
(in the absence of any defeaters) bridge the gap between appearances and 
reality.2 Richard Swinburne, however, has given the principle of credulity its 
current designation.3 Moreover, it is Swinburne's formulation of the principle 
of credulity that is most often discussed. 
The following is Swinburne's expression of Broad's original principle. 
(PC) It is a principle of rationality that (in the absence of special considera-
tions) if it seems (epistemically) to a subject that x is present, then 
probably x is present; what one seems to perceive is probably so.4 
While Swinburne's wording seems clear enough, for whatever reason, his 
principle has been the subject of many attempted refinements. Rowe's adap-
tation of the principle of credulity-a principle which he claims is identical 
to Broad and Swinburne's principle in every epistemically relevant wal-is 
as follows. 
(PC*) When subjects have an experience which they take to be of x, it is 
rational to conclude that they really do experience x unless we have 
some positive reasons for thinking their experiences are delusive. 
Clearly something like the principle of credulity is assumed at the com-
mon-sense level since initial perceptions are treated as being prima facie 
justified. They are seen as being innocent until proven guilty. Rowe, it seems, 
is in full agreement with this general contention. He suggests that the principle 
of credulity is a "basic principle of rationality" because "if in order to be justified 
in moving from appearances to reality we had always first to justify a principle 
linking the two, we would be hard put to avoid skepticism.,,6 
While Rowe does acknowledge that the principle of credulity is a "basic 
principle of rationality," he does object to the principle of credulity being 
employed in the case of an argument for the existence of God based on 
religious experience. 
The argument to which Rowe objects goes as follows: 
(I) Experiences occur which their subjects take to be experiences of God. 
(2) When subjects have an experience which they take to be of x, it is 
rational to conclude that they really do experience x unless we have some 
positive reasons for thinking their experiences are delusive (PC*). 
(3) There are no good, positive reasons for thinking that all or most expe-
riences which their subjects take to be of God are delusive. 
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(4) It is rational to believe that at least some experiences which their subjects 
take to be of God really are experiences of God. 
therefore, 
(5) It is rational to believe that God exists.7 
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While some have attacked this argument by claiming that (3) is false,8 Rowe 
does not feel that the prospects for this endeavor are very bright.9 Instead, 
Rowe attacks the theist's use of (2), the principle of credulity (PC*), by 
denying that it can be validly applied to an argument for the existence of God 
based on religious experience. The reason for his objection is that while in 
cases of sensory experience we are aware of the bodily and mental states 10 
which create a delusive perception, "we do not know how to discover positive 
reasons for thinking that religious experiences are delusive, if such reasons 
do exist." II 
Since Rowe desires to maintain the epistemic validity of the principle of 
credulity, he distinguishes between two versions of the principle of credulity, 
one which parallels Swinburne's version (PC*) and his expanded version 
(PCA) which addresses the aforementioned objection. 
(PC*) When subjects have an experience which they take to be of x, it is 
rational to conclude that they really do experience x unless we have 
some positive reasons for thinking their experiences are delusive. 
(PCA) When subjects have an experience which they take to be of x, and 
we know how to discover positive reasons for thinking their experi-
ences are delusive, if such reasons do exist, then it is rational to 
conclude that they really do experience x unless we have some 
positive reasons for thinking their experiences are delusive. 12 
Rowe suggests that PCA, not PC*, better expresses that which he thinks 
should be considered a basic (or universally applicable) principle of ration-
ality, since it includes an addendum regarding the subject's ability (or lack 
of ability) to recognize any existing defeaters for her perception. Moreover, 
since PCA cannot justifiedly be used to confer rationality on religious expe-
riences, Rowe claims that it is valid to both accept the principle of credulity 
and reject the argument for God's existence based on religious experience. 
One who desires to defend the application of the principle of credulity to 
religious experience might accept the validity of Rowe's version (PCA) but 
claim that, contrary to Rowe's assertion, this rendering of the principle of 
credulity can be used in the case of religious experience. To do so would 
involve showing that it is possible "to discover positive reasons (if such 
reasons exist) for thinking religious experiences are delusive." I suggest that 
the success of such an endeavor is not very likely.13 
Taking issue with Rowe's rejection of the evidential value of religious 
experience, therefore, will involve a rejection of PCA. 14 One approach will 
involve discussing one implication of accepting PCA. A second approach ques-
tions whether or not Rowe can apply PCA to his empirical argument from evil. 
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II. Rowe's Principle of Credulity as a "Basic Principle of Rationality" 
Rowe's modified principle of credulity (PCA) exists for the purpose of clearly 
distinguishing between that which is a proper object of the principle of cre-
dulity and that which is not. Clearly, "800 lb. occasionally invisible, but 
always malicious purple monsters under the bed" are not proper objects of 
the principle of credulity while red books typically are. Rowe's addendum to 
the principle of credulity which requires that one know how to discover 
positive reasons for thinking that their experience is delusive is designed to 
place religious experience in the same category with purple monsters-ob-
jects to which the principle of credulity should not be applied. In doing so, 
however, he has created for himself a dilemma. Given PCA, how does Rowe 
bridge the logical gap between an individual displaying physical symptoms 
indicative of mental activity and the actual existence of that person's mind? 
Indeed, minds are the charter member of a set of metaphysical realities whose 
existence is difficult to establish epistemically but are still widely (if not 
universally) accepted. IS 
For example, if I accept the validity of PC*, upon having an experience of 
Stanley, a person who gives every appearance of having a mind much like 
my own (unless, of course, I am aware of conditions which serve to defeat 
that perception-say, for example, that I know that it is Stardate 1234.5, and 
that I am on the bridge of the U.S.S. Enterprise, and Stanley is really Com-
mander Data I6), I am rational in believing that Stanley does in fact have a 
mind. With PCA, however, before I may rationally pronounce Stanley as 
"mind-having," I must first know how to discover positive reasons (if such 
reasons exist) for thinking that my experience might be delusive, i.e., I must 
be aware of bodily and mental states which would create a delusive experi-
ence. Unless I have access to privileged information (like I would have if I 
saw Data running a diagnostic check on his neural net), it seems that I would 
not know how to go about discovering such reasons. 
Rowe's desire to rule out religious experience as a proper object of the 
principle of credulity, I suggest, also forces him to undertake the notoriously 
difficult task of justifying his belief in other minds (and other similar meta-
physical realities) without resorting to PCA or any similar principle. It may 
be that Rowe will concede this point and seek to provide a non-credulist 
justification. While I doubt the ultimate success of such an endeavor, there 
exists an even more pressing difficulty with PCA. 
III. Rowe 50 Principle of Credulity and the 
Empirical Argument From Evil 
A second objection to Rowe's principle of credulity questions whether or not 
Rowe can live with the implications PCA has for his own empirical argument 
from evil. The empirical argument from evil, designed to show that God's 
existence is improbable, goes as follows. 
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(A) There exist evils that 0 (an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being) 
could have prevented, and had 0 prevented them the world as a whole 
would have been better. 
(B) 0 would have prevented the occurrence of any evil it could prevent, 
such that had 0 prevented it the world as a whole would have been 
better. 
Since (A) and (B) entail 
(C) 0 does not exist, 
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if (A) is probable and (B) is true, then it is probable that theism is false. 17 
While some have questioned the truth of (B),18 most who reject Rowe's 
argument have done so on the basis of the falsity (or probable falsity) of 
(A).19 While some argument may be made against (B), I will concentrate on 
(A). 
The evils referred to in (A) are pointless evils. An evil is "pointless" if it 
does not serve to bring about either the existence of a greater good or the 
eradication of an equal or greater evil. Rowe's example of such an evil is the 
following. 
Suppose in some distant forest lightning strikes a dead tree, resulting in a 
forest fire. In the fire a fawn is trapped, horribly burned, and lies in terrible 
agony for several days before death relieves its suffering.2o 
Clearly the evil which comprises the fawn's death is apparently pointless. 
This, however, does not imply that it is genuinely pointless, i.e., has no actual 
outweighing associated goods. 
For Rowe's empirical argument from evil to succeed, he must show that an 
experience of apparently pointless evil entitles us to infer that genuinely 
pointless evil also exists. Delmas Lewis notes that the following principle 
must be shown to be true before such an inference is warranted: 
(D) If there are goods for the sake of which 0 must permit instances of 
intense human and animal suffering then we would know or be able to 
imagine these goods and understand why 0 must permit the sufferings 
in order to obtain them.21 
Rowe, however, rejects Lewis's demand that the truth of (D) need be estab-
lished to bridge the logical gap between apparently pointless evil and genu-
inely pointless evil. He simply claims 
That things appear to us to be a certain way is itself justification for thinking 
things are this way. Of course, justification may be defeated. But apart from 
such defeat, the fact that things appear to us to be a certain way renders us 
rationally justified in believing that they are that way. 22 
Rowe therefore defends his position by appealing to the principle of credulity. 
This credulist assertion, however, parallels PC*, not PCA-there is no men-
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tion of Rowe's addendum. Is this omission significant? I suggest that it is. 
Rowe's defense of his jump from the apparent existence of pointless evil to 
the actual existence of pointless evil does not stand if his own principle of 
credulity (PCA) is applied. 
For the following to be true 
When subjects have an experience which they take to be of pointless evil, 
and we know how to discover positive reasons for thinking that experience 
delusive, if such reasons do exist, then it is rational to conclude that they 
really do experience pointless evil unless we have some positive reasons for 
thinking their experiences are delusive. 
Rowe must show that we know how to discover positive reasons for thinking 
that an experience of pointless evil is delusive and that no reasons exist. But 
how can he do so? What distinguishes a veridical experience of pointless evil 
from a delusory experience of pointless evil is, obviously, whether or not the 
evil which is experienced is actually pointless or not. 
Therefore, the task of "knowing how to discover positi ve reasons for think-
ing that an experience of pointless evil is delusive" would involve the difficult 
task of specifying bodily and mental states which would create a delusive 
perception of pointless evil. One could, of course imagine a voice from 
heaven, accompanied by astonishing miracles, which would proclaim, "There 
is a reason for all of these evils!" An especially compelling theodicy might 
also provide a degree of justification. In the absence of similar extraordinary 
phenomena, however, it seems that human cognitive, spatial, and temporal 
limitations make us unable to conceive of the breadth and depth of informa-
tion required to specify states which would cause a delusive perception of 
. I '1 23 pomt ess eVI . 
Clearly, on Good Friday, Peter must have viewed the crucifixion of his Lord 
as being consummately pointless. And yet, if the history of the Christian 
church and Christian theology are taken to mean anything at all, Christ's 
death, far from being pointless, was the greatest good of all. Although of less 
eschatological significance, there are similar experiences (I could list many 
personal examples) which also strengthen the contention that what seems 
pointless is often only so because the entire scope of the situation is not 
perceived. 
Therefore, since Rowe cannot meet his own criterion (i.e. specify how one 
might discover positive reasons for thinking that an experience of pointless 
evil is delusive), Rowe's own stronger principle of credulity (PCA) cannot, 
therefore, justify his claim that genuinely pointless evil exists. 
IV. Conclusion 
It seems that some revision of Rowe's position on religious experience or the 
problem of evil is in order. If Rowe's principle of credulity (PCA) is not valid, 
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then he must either provide us with reasons to reject Swinburne's principle 
of credulity (PC) or revise his negative assessment of the evidential value of 
religious experience. If his principle of credulity (PCA) is valid, then he must 
revise his empirical argument from evil in such a way as to bridge the logical 
gap between apparently pointless evil and genuinely pointless evil. Which he 
does is up to him. I have merely endeavored to show that one of the two 
ought to be done. 
InterVarsity Christian Fellowship, St. Paul, Minnesota 
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